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ESSAYS 
THE STATE OF LEGAL WRITING: 
RES IPSA LOQUITUR 
George D. Gopen* 
When Shakespeare made Hamlet say to the grave-digger: 
"Why may not this be the skull of a lawyer? 
Where now be his quiddities, his quillets, 
His cases, his tenures, and his tricks?" 
he was paying the profession a real compliment; and a compliment none 
the less because it was intended as a slur. A quiddity is defined by Web-
ster as a "trifling nicety," and the word quillet is another form of "quib-
ble." Both words seem to have been in fairly common use three hundred 
years ago and Shakespeare used them to express the sharpness of the 
lawyer and his facility in the use of words even in that day and time. For 
the ability of the lawyer to confuse others by the use of words has long 
been the subject of proverbs. The reasons for this distinction - or if you 
prefer, for this reproach - are not hard to find; they lie in the lawyer's 
training and in the work he is called upon to do. And yet, no matter 
what else may be said of him, the lawyer, in his field - even as the 
physician and the priest in theirs - remains the last resource of other 
men and women. When the wisdom of common men fails them and 
disaster is at hand, when the layman's brain is overworked until his 
mental fuse burns out, when the motor car of "Business" blows out its 
tires and piles up in the ditches of insolvency, when the human derelict is 
finally tossed upon the rocks by the stormy seas of life, then the lawyer is 
sent for and his "quiddities" and his "quillets" are more than welcome; 
then the myriad complexities of human frailty, and the baffling chicanery 
of men, test out all "his cases, his tenures, and his tricks." 1 
Ask the public: The first thing they associate with professors is 
tweed; the first with doctors (a tie here) is lots of money or bad hand-
writing; and the first with lawyers, written language that is impossible 
to understand. The lengthy quote above is from a 1921 article entitled 
The Language of the Law: Defects in the Written Style of Lawyers, 
Some Illustrations, the Reasons Therefor, and Certain Suggestions as to 
Improvement, and, ironically, it pronounces on the profession some-
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thing of a slur, even though it was intended as a real compliment. 
There is a glory, it seems, in the mystery of a language that can be 
deciphered only by initiates of the secret society; there is a great sense 
of power and an even greater actuality of power in controlling a lan-
guage that in turn controls the most pressing affairs of individuals and 
communities; and there is a monopolistic safety in being able to ma-
nipulate a language which because it was part of the creation of legal 
problems must be part of their solutions as well. It was true in 1921, 
and it is still true sixty-six years later. This essay will suggest some 
possible causes of traditional legal style and then explore some of the 
current attempts to do something about it. 
I. LEGAL LANGUAGE: USE AND ABUSE 
"Legal writing" is a misnomer. Every rhetorical problem that 
faces lawyers faces other professionals as well; only the particular com-
bination of those rhetorical needs is special to the law. We continue to 
use the term "legal writing" because we have not found a simple way 
of defining that combination, and because (as Justice Potter Stewart 
once said of hard-core pornography) we know it when we see it. Is 
there no "legal writing" of high quality, deep perception, and broad 
vision? Of course there is. Every firm or legal department I deal with 
(as a writing consultant) is quick to point out to me the two or three 
"really fine" writers in their midst; but that seems rather like Boswell's 
pointing out a tree in Scotland to disprove Johnson's complaint that 
there were no trees in Scotland. The demonstration of the exception is 
good circumstantial evidence of the aptness of the rule - or so a law-
yer might say. 
·In one of the best articles on the subject written to date, Professor 
Robert W. Benson neatly summarizes the major problems of what has 
come to be called "legalese": 
There is plentiful evidence that lawyer's language is hocus-pocus to 
non-lawyers, and that non-lawyers cannot comprehend it. There exist 
scores of empirical studies showing that most of the linguistic features 
found in legalese cause comprehension difficulties. Legalese is character-
ized by passive verbs, impersonality, nominalizations, long sentences, 
idea-stuffed sentences, difficult words, double negatives, illogical order, 
poor headings, and poor typeface and graphic layout. Each of these fea-
tures alone is known to work against clear understanding.2 
When I speak pejoratively of "legal writing," "legal language," or 
2. Benson, The End of Legalese: The Game Is Over, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 519, 
531 (1984-1985). 
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"legal prose," I am referring not only to the recognizable 
professionalisms: 
Provided always that these presents are upon this condition, heretofore 
agreed upon, that if the said rent shall be in arrears for a period of not 
less than two months, the party of the first part, or its assignees, .... 
nor only to the statutory monsters: 
Any person who obtains payment or acceptance and any prior trans-
feror warrants to a person who in good faith pays or accepts that ... he 
has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer is unauthor-
ized, except that this warranty is not given by a holder in due course 
acting in good faith ... to a drawer with respect to the drawer's own 
signature, whether or not the drawer is also the drawee .... 3 
I am referring as well to the failed attempts to communicate clearly 
and swiftly: 
Appellant's attempt to characterize the funds by the method of payment 
(reimbursement), rather than by the actual nature of the payment misses 
the mark. 
Lawyers need to be able to articulate clearly the steps and connec-
tions in a logical argument. Lawyers need to be able to maintain clar-
ity of expression, even in the face of complexity of thought. Lawyers 
need particularly to be able to write with both precision and anti-preci-
sion: for some documents they have to nail down particulars in order 
to avoid vagueness and ambiguity, while for others they will have to 
keep the letter free in order to protect the plasticity of the spirit in the 
advent of unforeseen circumstances. But none of these rhetorical 
needs need produce problematic prose; the causes of the problems lie 
elsewhere. Here are eight of them. 
A. Ejudicated Jargon 
Many lawyers will respond to an attack on their obfuscatory legal 
style by insisting that they have to write that way. By this they usually 
mean that so many words and phrases have been defined as terms of 
art by courts or by traditional professional usage that to use simpler 
synonymous words or structures would raise the presumption that 
they did not intend to mean what the legal term of art would have 
meant. Of course, the need for some arcane vocabulary hardly excuses 
all the other sins of legalese; but to a limited extent, the lawyers have a 
case. 
Historically, there is an extraordinary importance granted to accu-
racy of detail in legal proceedings. In medieval times trials often de-
pended on oath-taking and the accurate repetition of precise 
3. u.c.c. § 3-417 (1987). 
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statements by members of the community. The original "juries" were 
not fact-finders, but rather people who were willing to swear (French 
''jurer") that a certain thing happened a certain way. In some cases 
this meant that they each would have to read without error the same 
previously prepared statement. A single stumble (presumably caused 
by God who would not allow injustice to triumph) would indicate the 
falsehood of the statement and prove conclusive to the proceedings. 
Not all of medieval English law functioned in this manner; but enough 
of it did to impute a quasi-religious significance to the existence of 
particular words in a legal context. 
To make matters worse, the English and American common law 
systems were developed not by simplification and clarification but by 
addition and qualification. Not until 1968 could a case decided by the 
British Supreme Court be overturned; a precedent could not be de-
feated, but only distinguished away. Therefore the specifically legal 
meanings of words and concepts became the specialized knowledge of 
the practitioners; before the awesome complexity of the traditions, 
nonla:wyers could only stand in fear and trembling. 
There was in this process of addition and qualification, too, a touch 
of the religious. In many orthodox religions, it is more common by far 
for prayers and observances to be added to established rituals than to 
be deleted. As time goes by, the liturgy becomes longer, more dense, 
and less understood by the laity; it takes more of its meaning from the 
fact that it has existed than from the significance it was once intended 
to convey. Until quite recently the same has been generally true for 
the Law. Is granting a piece of property to X the same as granting it 
to "X and his heirs"? Was it always so? If it once was not, can it be so 
now? And who besides a lawyer would know? 
So it is true, to an extent: lawyers have to know their jargon and 
know its probable effects. They are probably safer in using the tradi-
tionally effective incantations than writing their own more modern, 
more streamlined tunes. But must they be confined to expressing 
something only as it has been expressed in the past? Example: A 
small business wants to hire a particular company to handle its invest-
ments. To be "legal" about it, the Board of Directors must sign a 
consent vote to the following text: 
Pursuant to the provisions of applicable law, Chapter 156B of the Mas-
sachusetts General Laws, the undersigned, being all of the Directors of 
Acorn Products, Inc., hereby consent to the following: 
VOTED: 
That the resolutions contained in the attached resolutions for the 
Thomas Mackay Securities Inc. Corporation Cash Account be and they 
hereby are adopted as actions of the Corporation, and that the clerk be 
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and he hereby is authorized and directed to execute and deliver said res-
olutions and the certificate contained therein in the form attached hereto 
and made a part hereof. 
Lacking the space here to investigate all the history of this off-putting 
bit of prose, let me point out only the fear and trembling in the "be 
and hereby are" formula. Quite possibly, someone long ago wrote 
such a document with the simpler phrase "that the resolutions be 
adopted" and learned in some court at a later date that the document 
meant "that the resolutions will be adopted at some time in the future 
but not necessarily now." Not to be burned twice, that someone elimi-
nated the loophole by adding the present tense, thereby resolving the 
ambiguity between the subjunctive and the future - "that the resolu-
tions be and hereby are adopted." Once that crept into the form 
books, who would dare put it otherwise? If something works, why 
take a chance with something else, merely for the increased reading 
ease of nonprofessionals? 
There is no simple way out of this. Leadership in this kind of re-
form must come from the institutions above, not from the individuals 
below. Such help is now to hand in many states, where "Plain Eng-
lish" laws are not only allowing but requiring that the ancient bandaid 
rhetoric be replaced by language that the populace at large can under-
stand - at least for documents like insurance policies and layaway 
plans, which directly affect large numbers of consumers. 
Leadership can also come from important law firms and large cor-
porate legal departments who dare to simplify. First, however, they 
must be convinced that the sanctity of their form books came not from 
God but from convenience, caution, and inertia. I recently succeeded 
in converting one corporate lawyer in a skirmish that bears repeating 
here. She had been specializing in her field for eight years but had 
been with her present firm only one year. I was consulting with the 
firm about writing skills and had a thirty-minute individual conference 
scheduled with her. She appeared at the appropriate time but denied 
that she needed any help, since she mostly spent her time piecing to-
gether the appropriate bits of boiler plate prose she found in the firm's 
form books. That boiler plate, she argued, had stood up successfully 
in the courts and therefore was not to be tampered with under any 
circumstances. I asked her if this firm's boiler plate was identical to 
that which she had used for seven years in her previous firm; she said 
no. I asked her how long it had taken her to adjust to the new boiler 
plate; she said that after a full year she was only just then starting to 
feel comfortable. So there it was: two completely different sacred 
pieces of prose, neither one of which could be altered in any detail, 
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even though they did precisely the same job. She was willing to take a 
closer look. Here is the paragraph on which we worked: 
1.08 Ownership 
All property and interests in property, real or personal, owned by the 
Partnership, will be deemed owned by the Partnership as an entity, and 
no Partner, individually, will have any ownership of such property or 
interest owned by the Partnership except as a tenant in partnership as 
provided in the Act. Each of the Partners irrevocably waives, during the 
term of the Partnership and during any period of the liquidation of the 
Partnership following any dissolution, any right it may have to maintain 
any act for partition with respect to any of the assets of the Partnership. 
The General Partner shall be authorized to provide for the holding of 
legal title to all or any part of the Partnership property in the name of 
any entity or person as trustee on behalf of the Partnership; provided, 
that any such trustee or nominee shall execute a certificate, suitable for 
recording, acknowledging that the beneficial owner of such property is 
the Partnership and agreeing to hold and dispose of legal title to such 
property in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. 
We applied certain structural revision techniques (further explored be-
low) sentence by sentence, and in fifteen minutes produced the follow-
ing, which she now insists differs not at all from the original in 
substance: 
1.08 Ownership 
Partnership property shall be owned by the Partnership entity and not 
by the Partners individually. Each Partner irrevocably waives any right 
to partition the property. Although the Partnership owns the property, 
the General Partner may authorize any person to hold legal title to the 
property as trustee or nominee for the Partnership. Such trustee/nomi-
nee shall execute a recordable certificate in which (i) s/he agrees to dis-
pose of legal title to the property in accordance with this Agreement and 
(ii) s/he acknowledges that the Partnership is the beneficial owner. 
The boiler plate battle can be won, but it will not even be engaged until 
the legislatures, the courts, and the leading lawyers become convinced 
it is worth fighting. 
B. The Problem of Precedent 
Lawyers work primarily with legal concepts that have been estab-
lished by statute or private agreement and have been elaborated upon 
by court decisions. The lawyers may be called to action by the facts of 
the present case, moved by those facts, and even convinced by those 
facts; but those facts will work against the client unless they can be 
properly and persuasively associated with principles of law that will 
resolve the issue in favor of the client. Lawyers, therefore, fill rela-
tively little space with interesting, human specifics, and are forced to 
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concentrate instead on the relatively nonhuman (some would say in-
human) legal concepts. Professor Steven Stark has put it nicely: 
But anyone who writes about rules and not facts is going to have a 
difficult time composing an appealing piece. What intrigues most read-
ers are stories about people; a story is usually the development of a char-
acter. For example, what would make the story in Erie v. Tompkins [a 
particularly thorny case, often used to begin courses in Civil Procedure] 
interesting to the typical reader is what happened to Tompkins, not what 
happened to the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. But the legal writer must 
ignore the "attractive part of a story and be content instead to discuss the 
application of rules in a way that tells lawyers what doctrines they, 
should follow. Even Joan Didion would have trouble doing much within 
those constraints.4 
Concentrating on what the law has said and how the present facts 
fit those concepts, lawyers keep foremost in mind the goal of making a 
totally subjective task (representing their client) accord as well as pos-
sible with that legal chimera, objectivity. Again, Stark: 
Legal language and style make the task easier. To begin with, lawyers 
can use labels to objectify and simplify: Ms. Jones and Mr. Smith be-
come tortfeasors or lessees. Or lawyers can resort to a style of writing 
replete with logical analysis and dozens of footnotes designed to show 
the objectivity of the legal process. Finally, because it aspires to objectiv-
ity, legal language may refuse to recognize troublesome concepts such as 
hope, candor, or even love. If the doctrine of standing means anything, 
it must be that certain perceived hurts are not recognized in conven-
tional legal discourse, perhaps because in an objective world they can 
have no universal meaning. 5 
C. The Club 
While many lawyers might feel discomfort in departing from the 
traditional diction, usage, and constructions of legal language, they 
also derive a sense of comfort and identity from the language that 
marks them as a tribe unto themselves. They belong to one of the 
largest clubs in American society, a group th,at uses language and tech-
nicality to distinguish itself from the public. One has to work hard to 
be admitted to the training ground and even harder to be accepted into 
the inner sanctum. The status of the profession comes from its power: 
"And yet, no matter what else may be said of him, the lawyer, in his 
field - even as the physician and the priest in theirs - remains the 
last resource of other men and women. "6 Its livery is its language. 
4. Stark, Why Lawyers Can't Write, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1389, 1391 (1984) (footnotes 
omitted). 
5. Id. at 1391-92. 
6. Lavery, supra note I, at 277. 
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There are practical, historical reasons for the existence of much of 
the "legal sound." In many cases the reasons have faded away but the 
language remains. For example, the familiar legal "doubling" (e.g., 
"cease and desist," or "made and entered into") probably began as a 
result of the translation of British law from Anglo-Norman ("Law 
French") into English. It was feared at the time (early sixteenth cen-
tury) that certain terms of art would be reexpanded in definition and 
lose their peculiarly legal significance by their translation into English. 
Where this was feared to be the case, the translation was made but the 
Anglo-Norman term was retained as well, thus producing the doub-
ling effect. We no longer need have the fear, but we still have the 
doubled terms. (Can one "cease" from doing something without "de-
sisting" as well?) 
Some lawyers will defend the retention of the doubled terms by 
recourse to a new fear - that some judge somewhere will insist that 
neither "cease" nor "desist" by themselves will have the same hal-
lowed legal effect of "cease and desist." Personally, I cannot imagine 
such an event; I suggest rather that lawyers have grown accustomed to 
their sound and are pleased with the way it sets them off from all 
others. It will be as difficult in some circles to dispossess the profes-
sion of its sound as it was for certain religions to abandon the original 
languages of their liturgy in favor of the vernacular. 
D. The Hostile Audience 
The lawyer's rhetorical task is arguably among the most difficult 
because, unlike other professionals, lawyers are constantly writing for 
hostile audiences. When a doctor writes an article for a journal or a 
report on a patient, the audience tends to spare no pains in trying to 
interpret the prose as the author intended. But when a lawyer writes, 
who is the audience? - a senior partner, who will play the devil's 
advocate in order to ensure its combat readiness; a judge, who will 
subject it to comparisons with the brief on the other side; or, worst of 
all, an opposing counsel who, fully cognizant of what the author in-
tended, will spare no pains to demonstrate that it might not, indeed 
cannot, mean that very thing. This is a great problem, not to be un-
derestimated. No wonder lawyers are so willing to repeat themselves, 
to plug small holes that might not even exist, to pile on much more 
information than the argument requires, and in general to use a shot-
gun approach (instead of a crossbow approach) to rhetoric. 
I would suggest that the main hope for overcoming this substantial 
problem lies in teaching lawyers structural stylistics. That is, if law-
yers can learn where readers tend to look in units of discourse for 
November 1987] The State of Legal Writing 341 
(e.g.,) emphasis, they can fill that slot with their emphatic material, 
thereby diminishing the possibilities for ambiguity. The same is true 
for the placement in the sentence of context and action, the placement 
in the paragraph of the point, and the placement in the document of 
the thesis. This approach has been used with great success in the last 
several years by some consultants and at some law schools.7 
E. Practical Pressures 
These are several. They all explain in part why lawyers turn out 
prose that is difficult to read, but they do not excuse it. In order to 
prepare lawyers to face these pressures, we should b.e teaching them a 
great deal more than we do about the language and about writing 
processes. 
The most pervasive practical pressure, especially in large firms, is 
time. Lawyers are almost always up against a deadline or up against 
the need to finish with the present problem in order to turn to others. 
Those needs translate into anxiety about speed and a heightened 
awareness of the passage of time. (Many a new law clerk, having been 
for so long a student, has had painful difficulties in adjusting to the 
requirement of accurately billing each minute of the day's work to the 
appropriate client.) 
These time pressures neither allow for long prewriting processes 
(at least not without an accompanying sense of great guilt or incompe-
tence) nor encourage patient revision; nor do th_ey foster the kind of 
fruitful creative fervor experienced by some journalists. Lawyers are 
regularly producing texts under conditions singularly ill-suited to the 
production of clear, readable prose. 
Add to that the pressures that result from camel creation - that 
is, from writing by committee. In all large firms, most medium-sized 
firms, and even many small firms, documents are created by several 
hands. Sometimes the task is divided into subtasks, each handled by 
an individual; other times several hands are set to the same problem. 
In either case the prose may well bounce from one individual to an-
other, then to a committee, then to a senior partner or two, then back 
to the committee, etc. In large corporations it might travel up and 
down several rungs of the corporate ladder several times. 
Problems arise in such multi-authored prose for two main reasons: 
(1) It is a hard enough task for any individual to attain a consistent 
style; without commonly shared principles of rhetoric, it is excruciat-
ingly difficult for a committee to do it. (2) As prose travels upwards to 
7. See text following note 42 infra. 
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higher and yet higher authorities, the handgun principle of power sets 
in - that is, if you have power, sooner or later you will use it just to 
demonstrate that you have it. A senior partner or a vice-president, 
unaware of the committee's methods of arriving at the proposed text, 
will send it back down with some changes made simply out of this 
sense of power or, failing that, out of a sense of duty. All too often the 
final prose product will suffer from incohesions and incoherences, the 
explanations for which lie in the needs of each of the participants to be 
heard. 
Another significant practical pressure, most often overlooked by 
the antilegalese literature: writing on legal subjects is usually im-
mensely difficult. Combine the nature of the substantive material with 
the complexity of the concepts, the hostility of the audience, and the 
time pressures of production, and which of us would 'scape whipping? 
It is always easier to note the flaws in someone else's work than to 
produce that revised quality from scratch. While we criticize legalese 
- justifiably and needfully - let us not condescend unnecessarily. 
There but for the lack of a law degree go most of us. 
The combined effect of these practical pressures is especially over-
whelming for lawyers who write (as far too many of us tend to write) 
by ear. With Time's winged chariot hurrying near, the committee 
chattering, the boss complaining, and the clients whimpering, one can-
not hear very much. Again, the solution must lie in the mastering of 
methods of argumentation and principles of style. 
F. The Toll Booth Syndrome 
A great many lawyers misconceive the nature of the writing task. 
In this the lawyer is not alone; any writer who neither enjoys the writ-
ing process nor is uplifted by the intellectual challenge presented may 
suffer from it as well. I call it the Toll Booth Syndrome. 
Picture the following as vividly as you can. You are a lawyer. 
You arrived at the office in New York at 6:30 a.m. to work on the big 
case. You have worked straight through to 9:00 p.m. You have re-
deemed your car from the parking lot and have fought both the traffic 
and the incipient inclement weather up into Connecticut. You ap-
proach a toll booth. The sign says "40¢ - Exact Change Left Lane." 
You search in your pocket and come up with a nickel, a dime, and a 
quarter - all the change you have. You enter the Exact Change lane. 
In front of you is a shining red light, but no barrier; to the left of you, 
the hopper. You are tired and irritable as you roll down the window, 
the wind and rain greeting you inhospitably. You heave the change at 
the hopper. The quarter drops in; the dime drops in; but the nickel 
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hits the rim and bounces out. What do you do? Do you put the car in 
park, get out, and grovel in the gravel for your nickel? Do you put the 
car in reverse and change to another lane where a human being can 
make change for your dollar bill? No. You go through the red light. 
You go through the red light, I would argue, because of a miscon-
ception of the purpose of tolls. At this anxious moment you are not 
feeling that before you continue on that road the government must 
receive from you 40¢, with which it will keep the roads in good repair 
and pay the toll booth operators. Instead you believe that before con-
tinuing on that road you must be dispossessed of 40¢. You have been 
dispossessed of 40¢. It is therefore moral, if a bit risky, for you to 
plunge further into the Connecticut darkness. 
That is the misconception lawyers (others too, but especially law-
yers) have concerning the writing task. So much work has preceded 
the actual writing: You may have interviewed the client, discussed the 
case with your associates, delegated tasks to your assistants, done the 
research, conceived of the strategies, taken the depositions, and organ-
ized the entire project. The thinking is done; now you have only to 
write it. You cast all of your knowledge on the subject out of your 
mind onto the paper, not caring if the audience will actually receive 
your 40¢ worth of wisdom, but caring only that you unburden yourself 
of it. It's all out there - on the paper, in the gravel - and that is 
what matters. 
Of course that is not what matters. The writing process is not to 
be separated from the thinking process; it is a thinking process. That 
concept, commonplace enough in English Departments nowadays, has 
not reached the majority of our lawyers. They get all the relevant 
information down on the paper; they refer to all the possible issues and 
suggest a number of different approaches and counterapproaches; and 
all the while they have no perception of how a reader not already 
knee-deep in the case will be able to wade through it all. 
G. The Lure of Money and Power 
In Woe Unto You, Lawyers!, Fred Rodell thunders: 
In tribal times, there were the medicine-men. In the Middle Ages, 
there were the priests. Today there are the lawyers. For every age, a 
group of bright boys, learned in their trade and jealous of their learning, 
who blend technical competence with plain and fancy hocus-pocus to 
make themselves masters of their fellow men. For every age, a pseudo-
intellectual autocracy, guarding the tricks of its trade from the uniniti-
ated, and running, after its own pattern, the civilization of its day. 8 
8. F. RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS! 3 (1939); see also Benson, supra note 2, at 531. 
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There are no greater powers than those of creation and dissolution. 
Lawyers have both, on a daily basis, because of the nature of their 
relationship to language. They create binding relationships between 
people where none existed before - a God-like task, making some-
thing out of nothing. They create whole entities (corporations) by the 
Adam-like power of naming. Those powers remain with the lawyers as 
long as nonlawyers cannot pierce the veil of legal language. 
Many people today, and presumably in the past, have seen through this 
mystical veil and perceived the secular nature of law .... What we have 
to consider is that, in essence, law is little different from political policy, 
administrative decision and military strategy. In itself therefore it would 
be seen for what it is, a form of political control, without much difficulty. 
Now clearly such transparency is contrary to the interests of ruling 
classes who always want to give their directions some universal legiti-
macy. It is also contrary to the interests of lawyers who need special 
status and esoteric services in order to continue - who would pay so 
much for mere political administrators?9 
Law professor Robert Benson cites the above passage and confesses: 
One need not be a neo-Marxist to find these social theories plausible. 
A noted Cambridge law professor once observed matter-of-factly: "For 
lawyers language has a special interest because it is the greatest instru-
ment of social control." An American law professor has boasted about 
the fact that "[a] common vocabulary and style enable lawyers to recog-
nize one another as lawyers and to distinguish themselves collectively 
from laymen .... The immense, baffling, and obscure vocabulary of the 
law is an important weapon in the hands of the established lawyers and 
professors for asserting superiority over the student." Every lawyer's 
personal experience bears witness to the fact that legalese can be a 
weapon. , Is there a lawyer among us who has not employed the magic of 
legal language as a psychological device to dominate some lay person? I 
confess I have done so many times - particularly when dealing with 
recalcitrant bureaucrats and corporate clerks - and I have frequently 
seen my comrades-in-law do the same. If there breathes a lawyer who is 
free from this taint, I shall immediately nominate him or her to receive 
the next Saint Thomas More Award from my law school. 10 
Along with that power comes the pay. In teaching lawyers how to 
clarify their language, I have often heard them express the fear that if 
their prose were to lose its arcane, ponderous, and technical qualities, 
their clients would be likely to protest the stunningly high costs in-
curred. For those who are not up on such things: In 1987, lawyer's 
fees of $200 per hour are quite common in many places, and $400 per 
9. C. SUMNER, READING IDEOLOGIES: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MARXIST THEORY 
OF IDEOLOGY AND LAW 275 (1979). 
10. Benson, supra note 2, at 530 (quoting Williams, Language and the Law (pt. I), 61 L.Q. 
REV. 71, 71 (1945), and Friedman, Law and Its Language, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 563, 567 & 
n.16 (1964)). 
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hour is by no means out of the question. Starting positions in Wall 
Street firms now offer upwards of $70,000 a year to the new graduates 
oflaw school. Clients who pay such prices, the argument runs, want to 
see their received value in terms of the degree of difficulty of the prod-
uct. It is annoying when immoral arguments find their basis in truth. 
Here, perhaps, is the core of the matter: It is in the lawyer's self-
interest to keep legal prose unreadable. If money, power, and prestige 
are all protected by keeping the layperson confused and awestruck, 
why should any lawyer voluntarily opt for clear, concise, communica-
tive prose? I can see only two possibilities: (1) if governments make it 
illegal to be obscure, then lawyers will be forced to clean up their 
prose; and (2) if lawyers discover that they can make a profit from the 
time saved in reading and writing clear prose, then they will accept the 
idea as a new professional challenge. Both projects are under way. 
H. Lack of Linguistic Awareness 
A lawyer who has risen above all of the problems already men-
tioned may still be a poor writer. That is, the lawyer who knows 
which bits of legal language are essential to maintain and which are 
not, who has learned to disdain the clubbiness of linguistic obfusca-
tion, who has learned to deal with the hostile audience and the practi-
cal pressures, and who is able to keep in mind at all times both the 
right of the audience to straightforward communication and the need 
of the audience to receive that which it gets thrown- that lawyer will 
still write poorly if he or· she has not somehow (either by intuition or 
education) become expert at fitting the substance of the thought to the 
linguistic structures and expectations that are inescapably part of the 
English language. 
Some people pick this up by ear; they "hear" what good writing 
sounds like and are then able to imitate what they think is style (but is 
more often structure) in their own prose. Others pick this up (with 
considerably more stress on the lower lumbar region) through educa-
tion. Unfortunately, those two groups combined do not represent a 
large percentage of the populace. Few read enough good prose to have 
an opportunity to use whatever ear they might have been born with; 
not many more have been lucky enough to study writing under a 
pedagogy that is effective for those without the good ear. 
II. WORKING ON THE PROBLEM: ATTACKS ON SEVERAL FRONTS 
With all the above problems and abuses, there is still at present a 
sense of hope in the air. 
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Public concern for the problem has never been more evident. 
There is actually a "Plain English movement," which has man-
aged to foster several successful attempts to have "Plain Eng-
lish" legislation passed in many states. 
There are signs of progress in education: Some effort is being 
made to awaken pre-law students to the need to study writing 
more seriously than their classmates; greater efforts are evident 
at the law school level, though few schools are claiming success-
ful breakthroughs; and both law firms and state bar associations 
are investing substantial sums in Continuing Legal Education 
programs in writing. 
The Law has recently come to be perceived by Humanists as an 
excellent field for cross-disciplinary attention. Particularly inter-
esting work is being done in the new fields of "Law and Litera-
ture" and "Law and Language." 
Academic and intellectual interest has been sparked. The 
number of books and articles on the subject has been increasing 
dramatically since 1960. 
A. Manifestations of Public Concern 
In recent years we have heard a great deal from the "Plain English 
movement," a somewhat organized, already effective, partial response 
to the problem of unreadable legal writing. It is difficult to date its 
inception, because the critics of legalese have been legion through 
many centuries now. Shakespeare's "The first thing we do, let's kill all 
the lawyers" (spoken by a butcher turned revolutionary) was not the 
first outcry by any means. I I At least as early as the thirteenth century 
there were provisions for citizens who lived far from London (and 
therefore far from most lawyers) to write their legal complaints in 
plain language instead of using the proper legal forms and formulas. 
(These complaints were called Bills in Eyre, and they give remarkable 
insights into medieval English life that the far more formal writs do 
not.)I2 
Neither are we the first to try to do anything about the situation. 
In 1566 the judge in Milward v. Welden IJ was incensed at a lawyer's 
having expanded what should have been a short pleading to 120 pages. 
He ordered a hole cut in the middle of the document, through which 
the offender's head was thrust; this interlocking pair was then to be led 
around Westminster Hall during court sessions as an example to fu-
ture padders and expanders. Thirty-four years later Sir Francis Bacon 
11. W. SHAKESPEARE, 2 KING HENRY VI, Part 2, IV, ii, 76 (G.W. Williams ed. 1967). 
12. For an excellent essay on the Bills in Eyre and an interesting selection of them, see 30 
SELECT BILLS JN EYRE, A.D. 1292-1333 (W. Bolland ed. 1914). 
13. 21 Eng. Rep. 136 (Ch. 1566). 
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was able to bring into effect Chancery Ordinance Rule 55 which sim-
plified the punishment somewhat: "If any bill shall be formed of an 
immoderate length both the party and the counsel under whose hand 
it passeth shall be fined." Neither of these bold attempts seems to 
have made a lasting effect on the profession. 
Sir Thomas More, Dean Swift, Jeremy Bentham, Charles Dickens, 
and a host of others have attacked lawyers for their language in the 
plainest and sometimes most acrimonious terms. (The lawyer has for 
four centuries been so much a stock character on the stage as not to 
require a proper name; "the lawyer" will do.) Bentham in particular 
had at the lawyers for "poisoning language in order to fleece their cli-
ents,"14 calling the resulting prose "excrementitious matter" and "lit-
erary garbage."15 In our century Fred Rodell led the way with a 
whole book on the subject, Woe Unto You, Lawyers! (1939). David 
Mellinkoff followed with two fine books, The Language of the Law 
(1963) and Legal Writing: Sense and Nonsense (1982), filled with de-
bunking good sense and scholarly evidence. 
We have gone beyond complaining to actually doing something 
about the problem. Minnesota led the way in 1977, shortly to be fol-
lowed by Maryland, by insisting through statute that insurance con-
tracts be written in language the average consumer of insurance 
contracts could understand. For all their predictions of disaster, many 
insurance companies have done a fine job of it, without suffering any 
long-term ill consequences. In 1978 New York passed a broader law, 
expanding the requirement to cover consumer contracts in general. 
As of mid-1986, twenty states16 had passed legislation requiring reada-
bility in insurance policies, and twelve states17 had yet more genera-
lized laws. 18 These are real victories, not to be underestimated. 
But there are problems, even with this high-principled, well-inten-
tioned effort. What exactly is meant by the term "Plain English" in 
this context? George H. Hathaway, chairperson of the Plain English 
Committee of the Michigan State Bar, offers the following: 
Plain English is the writing style that (1) all legal writing textbooks 
recommend, (2) the ABA Committee on Legal Writing recommends, (3) 
14. 5 J. BENTHAM, WORKS 236 (Bowring ed. 1843). 
15. 3 id. at 260. 
16. Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
17. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, 
New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and West Virginia. 
18. Information from the Document Design Center, American Institutes for Research, 
Washington, D.C. 
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all law students study in their law school course in legal writing, and (4) 
many law students and lawyers give lip service to, but often ignore for 
the rest of their law school and entire legal careers. 19 
The combination of hyperbole and wishful thinking exhibited in (1) 
through (3) here suggests one of the problems with the movement: 
There seems to be a belief that such a writing style can actually be 
identified and that we all could learn it from existing sources and prac-
tice it by the sheer will to do it. The facts are that (a) most writing 
textbooks recommend what the product should look like without of-
fering helpful advice on how to achieve it, and (b) a great majority of 
the legal writing courses in our law schools are poorly taught, reluc-
tantly taken, undercompensated on all parts, and therefore abject fail-
ures. Plain English, I would argue, is not quite as available a 
commodity as Mr. Hathaway suggests; nor, in the grey area cases, will 
we be sure to know it when we see it. Foes of plainer English will 
eventually attempt to use this imprecision to impede the progress of 
reform. 20 It behooves us to make sure that we prepare a valid defense. 
Mr. Hathaway goes on to name "[t]en typical elements of Plain 
English": 
(1) a clear, organized, easy-to-follow outline or table of contents, 
(2) appropriate captions or headings, 
(3) reasonably short sentences, 
( 4) active voice, 
(5) positive form, 
(6) subject-verb-object sequence, 
(7) parallel construction, 
(8) concise words, 
(9) simple words, and 
(10) precise words. 21 
One can only be pleased with the general intent of such attempts at 
definition; however, some of the details viewed more closely leave 
something yet to be desired. 
(1) A clear outline or table of contents: Often of great help. How-
ever, the worst-offending legalese document imaginable might still 
boast a stunningly clear table of contents. 
(2) Appropriate captions or headings: indeed. But once again, 
many offendants do well in this category. 
19. Hathaway, An Overview of the Plain English Movement for Lawyers, 62 MICH. B.J. 945, 
945 (1983). 
20. I wonder, for example, how the courts will handle the cases of conflicts of laws arising 
from Plain English statutes. What is to be done when the same J.C. Penney layaway plan is 
deemed "Plain English" by a court in Ohio but "Legalese" by a court in Arizona? On whom will 
the courts call? And what will be the consequences for future drafters? 
21. Hathaway, supra note 19, at 945. 
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(3) Reasonably short sentences: a real problem. Much of the 
Plain English movement's activity has been geared towards getting 
lawyers to write shorter sentences. Readability tests, especially that of 
Rudolph Flesch, have been used to argue that since sentences which 
contain more than twenty-nine words are hard to read, then lawyers 
should not write many sentences over twenty-nine words. The logic 
here is false. 22 If sentences with more than twenty-nine words are 
often harder to read, it is more than often because they were written 
by people who did not know how (in Joseph Williams' words) to "con-
trol the sprawl."23 Simple declaratory sentences can be kept under 
twenty-nine words with little difficulty. But lawyers spend much of 
their writing effort trying to articulate the connection between two 
simple declaratory thoughts. They cannot afford to juxtapose "here's 
a fact" with "here's a legal concept" and expect an impartial judge or 
hostile opposing counsel to supply the appropriate logical process 
which will lead to the conclusion desired. In order to link the facts to 
the concept, or the concepts to other concepts and therefore to a spe-
cific conclusion, the lawyer must articulate the connection; that neces-
sarily produces longer sentences. The problem is not how to make 
lawyers write shorter sentences, but rather how to get them to manage 
long sentences far better than they now are able. In the process, the 
redundancies, the loophole plugs, and other assorted "fat" will natu-
rally be trimmed away. The typically long legal sentence is a manifes-
tation of our lawyer's rhetorical inabilities, not its cause. 
( 4) Active voice: trouble here. Just because the passive voice is 
grossly abused by most professional writers, legal or otherwise, we 
have no cause to exclude it as a rhetorical strategy. Authoritarian 
powers (most high school teachers, some governments, a few religions) 
who condescend to their populations as undiscriminating children find 
it easier to forbid all of an activity than to instruct the children how to 
choose between good and bad. If 85% of all passives are bad passives, 
then ridding prose of all passives will be a net gain of 70% (the 85% 
gain minus the 15% loss of good passives). We ought to shoot for 
100% instead. 
If agency is unknown, and that particular lack of knowledge is not 
22. I do not by any means intend by this simplification to deny totally the worth and interest 
of the work done with readability formulas. But the final products of their numbers can be used 
abusively by a reformer who has not taken the time to explore all the ramifications of the studies. 
For an intriguing summary of the applicability of these formulas to the problem of legalese, see 
Benson, supra note 2, at 547-58. 
23. Although not written expressly for lawyers, J. WILLIAMS, STYLE: TEN LESSONS IN 
CLARITY & GRACE (2d ed. 1985) remains the single best text for lawyers to read. Its methodol-
ogy is ideally suited to the kinds of complexities spawned by legal problems. 
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the point in question, the passive does well. ("The note was left before 
4:00 p.m.") If agency is known but would be intrusive if articulated, 
the passive does well. ("Each horse will be tested for drugs at the end 
of each race.") If the passivity of a person is the point to be empha-
sized, then the passive does well. ("The Senator was led by his theory 
to the following ludicrous conclusion: . . . . ") And more. 
It is true that lawyers tend more than most to hide agency by re-
course to the passive. It is also true that because of this, lawyers have 
learned to "hear" legal arguments as being predominantly set in the 
passive, and therefore by imitation to diminish yet further the use of 
the active. However, we should not let the fear of abuse lead us to do 
away with such a useful rhetorical device; instead we need to teach 
people when and how to use it effectively. 
(5) Positive form: not always possible, but where possible, usually 
better. 
(6) Subject-verb-object sequence: ??. Nearly every grammatical 
English sentence that is not a question proceeds syntactically in this 
order. Native speakers of German have a problem now and then, and 
some poets (like Milton) delight in moving things around; but nearly 
all lawyers write nearly all their sentences, good ones and bad ones, in 
the subject-verb-object sequence. There is no problem here. 
(7) Parallel construction: a good technique to master. Of course, 
the construction by itself has no virtue. It works well only where the 
substance is parallel in nature. On occasion the substance might be 
antithetical in nature, which would better be served by chiasmus 
(xyyx) than by parallel construction (xyxy). Such exceptions aside, a 
greater awareness and skillful use of parallel construction would help 
to remedy certain problems with legal prose. 
(8)-(10) Concise words: they would help; 
simple words: yes, but only where simplicity is attainable 
without sacrificing accuracy and depth; 
precise words: certainly. 
But to concentrate on the most evident manifestations of legal prose 
(here the jargon) is to miss that far more destructive force of dilapi-
dated structure. If all the units of discourse in an atrocious legalese 
document were restructured so that the relationships between the vari-
ous words, actors, acts, and concepts were clearly delineated, then the 
presence of elongated and complex words would matter relatively lit-
tle. (The restructuring would necessitate the choosing of precise 
words.) At the least, we would know quite specifically what questions 
to ask - e.g., "What is meant by 'bailee'?" 
My criticisms here are aimed not at the intent of the Plain English 
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movement, but at the lack of sophistication of some of its linguistic 
precepts. Our gratitude to those involved in the leadership of the 
movement should not be allowed to render us uncritical. We must 
take care not to treat the symptoms in place of the diseases, and we 
must not neglect a prime source of the problem - the widespread 
absence of effective programs for teaching the art and craft of clear 
writing to law students and lawyers. 
We should also take a quick look at the offerings of the allegedly 
responsible opposition. Their battle has not been waged much in 
print. The practitioners of legalese simply refuse. delivery; they do not 
often attempt to justify their refusal on paper. An exception is Ray J. 
Aiken, who responded to John Hager's 1959 article, Let's Simplify 
Legal Language, 24 with his own 1960 article, Let's Not Oversimplify 
Legal Language. 25 (In 1960 it was still respectable to defend legalese 
in public.) 
Aiken took the high road, defending the complexity 'of legal lan-
guage with great pride and condescension: "[T]o cry for simplification 
in a te[c]hnical field is much like criticizing D[a] Vinci because his 
paintings so little resemble those of Al Capp or Grandma Moses."26 
He claimed he would "feel a bit foolish" instructing his class in the 
doctrine of "the thing speaks for itself" instead of the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur (Latin for "the thing speaks for itself"). 27 
He offered eight improvements. Some are straightforward and un-
controversial, like requiring law students to buy dictionaries. Some 
boomerang: those who wish to become lawyers should study foreign 
languages, not to understand language better, but to be able to substi-
tute foreign words for English words whenever the foreign word is 
more precise. Some are sheer bravado: that it be made "a professional 
misdemeanor, publicly punishable as such by the organized profession, 
for any lawyer to utter any document which flagrantly abuses recog-
nized principles of composition, or demeans the high standard of liter-
acy which the legal profession has traditionally sought to uphold."28 
(This sanction is to be visited not only upon the obfuscators, but also 
upon those who oversimplify.) But the telling "improvement" brings 
us back to the issue of power by and over language: 
24. Hager, Let's Simplify Legal Language, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 74 (1959). 
25. Aiken, Let's Not Oversimplify Legal Language, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 358 (1960); see 
also Morton, Challenge Made to Beardsley's Plea for Plain and Simple Legal Syntax, 16 CAL. ST. 
B.J. 103 (1941); Friedman, supra note 10; Steuer, Legal Vocabulary- Its Uses and Limitations, 
PRAC. LAW., Apr. 1969, at 39. 
26. Aiken, supra note 25, at 362. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 364. 
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5. That no person unlicensed in law be permitted to draft, or to advise 
another respecting the proper interpretation of any will, conveyance, 
trust instrument, formal contract, law, ordinance, or government 
regulation. 
To this he adds the following footnote: 
It might be supposed that this is but a slight extension of present unau-
thorized practice regulations. It is intended, however, to obviate the 
problem which so greatly concerns Professor Hager - that the non-law-
yer cannot interpret the law, or the lawyer's document. I would discour-
age the attempt of the non-lawyer to do so, thereby saving him his 
inevitable failure.2 9 
A quarter of a century later, no one is willing to go on the record with 
these sentiments; but, in my estimation, they still command the major-
ity opinion. 
A somewhat more sophisticated attempt to stem the tide of the 
Plain English movement is David S. Cohen's lengthy reply to Carl 
Felsenfeld's comments in the published panel discussion, The Plain 
English Movement. 3° Cohen expresses five serious concerns: 
[1.] [P]lain English contracts and legislation are not the only vehicles 
for achieving increased information access in consumer contracting .... 
[2.] [B]ecause plain English contracts use the process of market trans-
fer to encourage information flow, the result may be a disproportionate 
level of benefits being received by a limited, select group of consumers. 
[3.] [P]lain English legislation ... has focused on simplicity of lan-
guage which may not bring about a concomitant reduction in the com-
plexity of contracts .... 
[4.] [T]he plain English movement ... reintroduces a concept of con-
tract as a bilateral event rather than a multilateral process, focusing judi-
cial attention on a discrete, simple document, with the possible result 
that the reality of consumer decision-making may become less relevant 
to a determination of legal rights. . . . 
[5.] ... a cynical but realistic appraisal of the likelihood that any ame-
lioration of consumer contracts will come about as a result of the plain 
English movement. The conceptual complexity of a great deal of con-
tractual information, the difficulty of inter-contract comparisons of the 
value of various mixes of price and non-price terms, and the contracting 
process itself, persuade [Cohen] that all that will result [from the plain 
English movement] is the transfer of paper bearing simple language.31 
I find Cohen's arguments highly imaginative and worth contem-
plating; but in the end they seem to me based on the straw man argu-
ment that the Plain English movement intends to cure all contract 
language ills. His final cynicisms are likely to have the effect either of 
clinching his arguments or of discrediting his motivations entirely: 
29. Id. at 364 & n.17. 
30. The Plain English Movement: Panel Discussion, 6 CAN. Bus. L.J. 408 (1982). 
31. Cohen, Commellt 011 The Plain English Movement, 6 CAN. Bus. L.J. 421, 422 (1982). 
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For the majority of consumers, plain language contracts may simply 
make us feel better. Feeling better may be valuable, indeed that may be 
all that we are paying for in contracting for consumer goods. If that is 
so, then it makes little difference if we derive pleasure from the good or 
the contract language. And if feeling better is worth the price, then the 
transaction - the purchase of the psychological satisfaction of believing 
that we know what we are doing - may be effi.cient.32 
There has recently been a most interesting attempt in print to com-
bat the rising forces of antilegalese critics - Richard Hyland's A De-
fense of Legal Writing. 33 Although more articulate and intellectually 
grounded than most of the articles in the field, it nonetheless seems not 
to produce what its title implies (a defense of legal style), but rather to 
mount an attack on the impracticality of some of legal style's main 
detractors. Hyland spends what seems to me a· disproportionate 
amount of time rebutting those who suggest that lawyers simplify their 
language and imitate Hemingway - a suggestion I do not find as om-
nipresent in the literature as he does. But eventually he abandons this 
tack and himself joins what he identifies as a minority of the critics of 
legalese, arguing that poor legal thinking has indeed produced a great 
deal of poor legal writing. "When lawyers do not understand the 
structure of their argument before writing the final draft, their writing 
will be loose and flabby and the easy prey of syntactical and other 
grammatical errors. All the rules of Plain English will then not pre-
vent passive voice and dangling modifiers."34 
Hy land's partial equation of bad· writing with bad grammar is un-
fortunate ("the easy prey of syntactical and other errors"); but else-
where he makes the sounder point that shallow intellectuality in the 
legal profession is tending to produce shallow thought, which is in 
turn manifested by (not merely productive of) poor writing. 
The problem with legal writing is not that there are too many "herein-
befores" and not enough metaphor. The problem is that lawyers cannot 
write clearly unless they can think clearly, unless they can recognize and 
construct a convincing legal argument - unless, in other words, they 
understand the structure of the law.35 
His penultimate paragraph: 
I do not hold much hope for the future of legal writing in America. 
Because few sources remain for the widespread infusion of conceptual 
understanding into legal education, I suspect that each generation of 
lawyers will write at least as badly as its predecessor. Legal writing will 
32. Id. at 445. Professor Cohen's arguments may also be undercut by his own highly 
nominalized and often turgid writing style. 
33. Hyland, A Defense of Legal Writing, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 599 (1986). 
34. Id. at 620-21. 
35. Id. at 621. 
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become increasingly technocratic as prescriptions generated by unexam-
ined premises are continually applied to misperceived situations.36 
Thus the author of A Defense of Legal Writing ends with a despairing 
comment far more cynical than most of the opinions he began by at-
tacking. More damaging testimony would be hard to produce. 
Civil and civilized readers owe a great deal of thanks to the ener-
getic and farsighted people who have' led the Plain English movement. 
The Document Design Center of the American Institutes for Re-
search, under the leadership of Janice Redish, Veda Charrow, and 
others, has done a great deal of good work on the structuring of gov-
ernmental and technical documents. Because of the hard work of lo-
cal bar associations and state legislatures, many insurance companies, 
landlords, banks, department stores, and others that deal regularly 
with the populace at large now must say what they mean in a way that 
the meaning can be easily perceived. The fear of having something put 
"in writing" has been transferred in part from the purveyee to the 
purveyor. (As a result there is a growing tendency among lawyers to 
communicate with clients orally instead of by letter.) Ever since Con-
necticut legislation was passed in October of 1978, no insurance com-
pany can afford to be seen walking around Hartford with its head 
sticking through a hole in a 120-page document. Plain English is be-
ginning to have an effect in these particularly public areas; but now 
that the law says we must write in Plain English, we have to educate 
our new lawyers so they will be able to do so. 
B. Efforts to Improve the Teaching of Writing to Lawyers 
1. Writing Courses for Pre-Law Students 
I find it curious that relatively so little effort has been made to train 
pre-law students with advanced composition courses. One would think 
this was the ideal opportunity to deal with some of the questions of 
language that seem to law students an unnecessary burden added to 
legal studies. Yet there are few articles on the subject37 and only one 
textbook produced specifically for this purpose.38 
36. Id. at 625 (footnote omitted). 
37. See Gopen, A Composition Course for Pre-Law Students, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1978); 
Hirsh, Writing About the Law: A Composition Course for Pre-Law Studellts, 2 J. BASIC WRITING 
82 (1980); White & Brand, Composition for the Pre-Professional: Focus on Legal Writing, 27 
COLLEGE COMPOSITION & CoMM. 41 (1976). 
38. See G. GOPEN, WRITING FROM A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (1981). A writing text that can 
be adapted for an undergraduate course is N. BRAND & J. WHITE, LEGAL WRITING: THE 
STRATEGY OF PERSUASION (1976). A fascinating text, though significantly harder to adapt to 
such a writing course, is J.B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF 
LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (1973). 
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Sources of hope for future discussion of the problems and possibili-
ties are the Association for the Teaching of Advanced Composition 
(ATAC), founded in 1982, and the pages of the Journal of Advanced 
Composition. 
Stranger still than this silence was the structure of the nation's 
leading (perhaps only) pre-law major program, at Rice University. 
The program was founded about ten years ago, lived a vibrant, intrigu-
ing life, and presently is being dismantled for lack of faculty availabil-
ity. (Apparently the student interest is still high.)39 The program 
offered every area of pre-law study imaginable with one exception: 
there was no composition course. In the light of statements from law 
school deans across the country that the most important pre-law abili-
ties to develop are those of critical reading and critical writing, 40 this 
absence of a writing course from the Rice program remains a mystery. 
Schools that have offered special composition courses for pre-law 
students (Illinois, Utah, Wayne State, Loyola of Chicago, amongst 
several others) have generally found them well received and oversub-
scribed. Here is clearly a fertile area for expansion. 
2. Writing Courses and Programs at Law Schools 
Here much has been written about, tried, discarded, reinstated, 
and reconsidered. The main strivings have been towards discovering 
the perfect structure for law school writing instruction. The results 
have not been encouraging, with a few notable exceptions. Many 
courses have been established, but few programs have resulted. 
The typical nonprogram in writing at law schools is shaped some-
thing like this: 
(1) First year 
(a) Fall semester: Legal Methods, Research, and Writing (one 
or two credits, compared to three for other courses). Much time 
spent on tasks other than writing; instructor either a part-time 
adjunct not trained in writing pedagogy or an upper-class stu-
dent, equally untrained. 
(b) Spring semester: Moot court experience (one credit or no 
credit), for which a brief is written; criticism offered by upper-
class students. 
(2) Second year 
Nothing. 
(3) Third year 
Either 
(a) One twenty-page paper written in conjunction with a semi-
39. Telephone interview with Professor Baruch Brody, Rice University (June 19, 1986). 
40. Letters from 72 law schools to the author (on file with the author). 
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nar; little or no attention paid to the writing process; revisions 
rarely allowed; or 
b) Nothing. 
Even in schools where the first-year program has some efficacy, stu-
dents tend to lack reconfirmation of their newly gained skills because 
of the lack of later writing opportunities. In light of the importance to 
lawyers of controlling the language and the particular rhetorical diffi-
culties that confront the legal profession, this absence of care and of 
competence in the teaching of writing at law schools is stunning. Ab-
solutely everyone at these schools complains - the students of having 
to take a course undervalued and poorly taught, the instructors of not 
knowing how to engage their students and manage the task effectively, 
and the administration of having to schedule, staff, and pay for the 
whole affair. 
As one might expect, the major variations (and many of the pub-
lished articles) concern who will do the teaching - upper class law 
students? part-time faculty (either lawyers who have an interest in 
teaching or English teachers who cannot find other employment)? full-
time faculty hired specifically for the purpose? or regular law school 
faculty? These variations are explained and well-documented in two 
review articles.41 
A few of these variations in structure have achieved a certain mea-
sure of success. Some law schools, like John Marshall (Chicago) and 
the University of Puget Sound, have added writing requirements in the 
second year. Others, like Harvard and Indiana, offer elective writing 
seminars with great regularity, the popularity of which is due in great 
part to the skills of the instructors, Steven Stark and Perry Hodges 
respectively, who have taught there for several years and have estab-
lished substantial reputations as part-time members of the faculty. 
Significantly, this sense of permanence (or at least continuous pres-
ence) seems to be the one factor that distinguishes attempts like these 
that work from those that do not. 
Through the stability of a sense of continued presence, Notre 
Dame has found a successful formula for a course, if not yet for a 
whole program. Six years ago it hired Theresa Phelps, an English 
Ph.D. with no legal training, to run a legal writing course that was, for 
the first time, to be separate from the legal research and methods in-
struction. After two successful years under one-year contracts, Phelps 
was offered a tenure-track position to teach legal writing in the re-
41. See Boyer, Legal Writing Programs Reviewed: Merits, Flaws, Costs, and Essrmtia/s, 62 
CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 23 (1985); Gale, Legal Writing: The Impossible Takes a Little Longer, 44 
ALB. L. REV. 298 (1980). 
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quired first-year course (160 students), to offer a Law and Literature 
elective on the upper levels, and to be available for individual tutorial 
six hours weekly. Notre Dame thus legitimized instruction in writing 
by establishing a potentially permanent spot on their faculty for an 
appropriate specialist. Professor Phelps has now developed two sub-
stantial volumes of legal materials for her writing assignments and, 
through her own studies and directing a staff of teaching assistants, 
has garnered enough legal knowledge to put her safely ahead of her 
students. She has proved that a J.D. is not necessary to success as a 
teacher of legal writing. She is also one of a new breed of professionals 
proving that one now can make a career of legal writing. 
To my knowledge, only one law school in the country has been 
bold enough to do what logic and sound pedagogy demand - to im-
plement a three-year writing requirement for all law students. That 
school is Chicago-Kent, affiliated with the Illinois Institute of Tech-
nology. The director of the program is Ralph Brill, former Associate 
Dean and former Acting Dean - in other words, a person 'of stature 
in the school, no underpaid "specialist" invited from the· outside and 
given a part-time salary and half an office. 
In their first year at Chicago-Kent, students take a two-semester 
writing course, three hours each term, in which they learn to do re-
search, to write memos, to revise effectively, to construct appellate 
briefs, and to argue orally. Of the three memos assigned in the Fall 
and the twenty-five-page brief and twenty-page law review type article 
assigned in the Spring, all but one undergo substantial revisions. 
These courses are taught by nine full-time instructors, most of whom 
hold the J.D. and all of whom are paid substantially more than a new 
Ph.D. in English (although a bit less than a new law professor) .. They 
are assisted by third-year law students of the highest promise, who 
help to prepare materials but do no teaching. Classes are limited to 
enrollments of twenty-two students. 
In the second year, all students again take two writing-intensive 
courses. In the Fall they study legal drafting with local practitioners 
in real estate law, commercial law, or in general practice. Typically 
they will be assigned five different documents to draft. The classes 
meet once a week for two hours, receive two credits, and are limited in 
enrollment to fifteen. In the Spring term the course is called "Ad-
vanced Research" and concerns the law of one of the following five 
fields: tax law, securities law, labor law, environmental law, or inter-
national law. Each student writes two fifteen-page papers and does 
several smaller research exercises. Classes are again limited to fifteen 
students and are taught either by local practitioners or by full faculty. 
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The third-year writing requirement can be fulfilled either by taking 
an independent study with a faculty member (twenty-five page paper, 
several drafts, one or two credits) or by taking one of a number of 
seminars (same length paper, plus oral presentation of material, two 
credits). 
Reports on this program are uniformly positive. It owes its suc-
cess, it seems, to the following: (1) The directorship is in the hands of 
a respected senior faculty member; (2) full credit is given for student 
effort at every stage of the requirements (to a maximum of eleven cred-
its total); (3) much of the instruction is done by full-time faculty, some 
of whom specialize in teaching writing; and (4) over a quarter of a 
million dollars is spent on this instruction yearly. For its pains and its 
money, Chicago-Kent has clearly profited in the following ways: 
1) The school has increased its visibility and its reputation, some Chi-
cago firms preferring to hire Kent graduates over others "because they 
know how to write"; . 
2) The students graduate with the experience of having written a great 
many different kinds of legal documents, of having had them scrutinized 
by academics and practicing professionals alike, and of having the op-
portunity through revising papers to gain confidence in their ability to 
handle professional prose; 
3) Many of the students who act as teaching assistants are able to find 
opportunities teaching legal writing at other schools; 
4) Many of the adjunct faculty continue on to full-time teaching posi-
tions elsewhere. 
This is a model that works and that should be imitated by others. 
From the few successes we have seen to date, it appears that suc-
cess in constructing legal writing programs remains a question of cash 
and credit. Certain elements are required for a writing program to 
work at a law school: 
1) Sufficient money must be expended on competent faculty spe-
cialists (that is, on people trained or experienced in the teaching of 
writing); 
2) Sufficient credit must be given to students for their labors to 
allow them to expend as serious an effort on improving writing as they 
do on learning Torts or Trusts or Tax law; 
3) A certain amount of writing instruction must be made avail-
able, preferably required, in all six terms of law school, not just in the 
first half of the first year; 
4) Perhaps most importantly, a consistent methodology must be 
adopted by the program as a whole, so that students of any one section 
or year may talk intelligibly with any faculty member and all other 
students about the standards of cohesive and coherent prose. 
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"A consistent methodology": perhaps it is the consistency that is 
essential here, the methodology being an orderly way of achieving it. 
Cunning writers assess their audience before adopting a tone and a 
strategy. Students are forced by their role in life to be amongst the 
most cunning of writers (whether or not they are the most capable). 
Bright undergraduates spend the first half of any course figuring out 
what that particular teacher wants and the second half of the course 
producing it. The subtle but pervasive cynicism in our students (which 
often develops into a straightfonvard anti-intellectualism) stems in 
great part from their perceiving their education as a series of audience-
detection problems. For the cause of that perception we have but to 
consider our own peevish idiosyncracies concerning their writing. 
It may or may not be too much to expect an entire faculty of an 
undergraduate college to agree on how to approach the criticism of 
written work. (Programs christened "Writing Across the Curricu-
lum" are now in the process of trying to affect this at many institu-
tions.) It should not be too much to expect a law faculty to give it a 
whirl. Legal audiences are limited in number and character: thor-
ough senior partners, impartial judges, partial administrators and poli-
ticians, cautious allies, hostile adversaries, and questioning clients. 
The genres of legal writing are even more limited in number and char-
acter: memos to files and to collaborators, letters to clients and to 
adversaries, contracts both precise and anti-precise, briefs of persua-
sion. Surely there must be ways of regarding and manipulating lan-
guage - which after all is a system of functioning structures - that 
would most adequately fulfill these particular and somewhat well-de-
fined needs. Even more than the choice of methodologies, it matters 
that the school adopt a single, consistent approach to the language 
that will be shared by all the students and encountered in many of the 
classes. The recent activity in the textbook market provides and 
promises to continue to provide a number of alternatives from which 
to choose. 
One such methodology has proved extremely effective recently. It 
is a product of practicality, spawned not in the classroom but in the 
conference rooms of law firms, corporate legal departments, and gov-
ernmental agencies across the country. Its four developers are Joseph 
Williams and Frank Kinahan (of the University of Chicago), Gregory 
Colomb (of Georgia Tech), and the present author.42 
42. Some of this methodology is currently available in print. See J. WILLIAMS, supra note 23; 
Gopen, Let the Buyer in the Ordinary Course of Business Beware: Suggestions for Revising the 
Prose of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1178 (1987); Gopen, Perceiving 
Structure, HARV. L. SCH. BULL., Summer/Fall 1984, at 27. A textbook for law schools is forth-
coming from Little, Brown & Co. The same publishers will also be releasing in the near future 
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There is not room enough here to present that methodology in de-
tail; but its guiding concepts can be succinctly enough stated and have 
been introduced above. 43 It has been discovered that readers expect 
certain things of the strµcture of any unit of discourse, be it a clause, a 
sentence, a paragraph, an essay, a memo, a brief, or a book. Readers 
also have a certain limited amount of energy they expect to have to use 
for each of those units of discourse. If a writer can learn where read-
ers expect to find the different components of the writer's substance, 
then the writer can manipulate that substance so that it appears where 
the reader expects to find it. The results: ambiguities decline, and 
readers are freed to use their energy for perceiving the writer's sub-
stance instead of expending most of it to untangle the writer's 
structure. 44 
To exemplify this concept briefly, I return to an example quoted 
near the beginning of this essay. Reconsider the following typically 
annoying bit of legal prose: 
Appellant's attempt to characterize the funds by the method of payment 
(reimbursement), rather than by the actual nature of the payment misses 
the mark. 
This sentence is difficult, I suggest, not simply because it is "too long" 
or "wordy" or "awkward" or "unclear." It may be all those things to 
the reader, but not to the writer. It fails, instead, because it frustrates 
certain reader expectations of sentence structure, most particularly the 
expectation that a subject will be followed almost immediately by its 
verb. Here the subject ("attempt") is separated from its verb 
("misses") by nineteen words, almost 80% of the sentence. While the 
reader waits for the verbal shoe to drop, the reader is not free to con-
centrate on what seems to be interruptive material. As it turns out, 
the "interruption" was the whole shooting match. The reader discov-
ers that only in retrospect. Solution: put the subject and verb to-
gether, and the structure reveals itself: 
Appellant misses the mark in her attempt to characterize the funds by 
the method of payment (reimbursement), rather than by the actual na-
ture of the payment. 
We are now free to see that the important substance of this sen-
tence is the contrasting of the words "method" and "nature." We are 
R. WEISBERG, WHEN LAWYERS WRITE, aimed primarily at practitioners. Other books of great 
interest that are currently in print include V. CHARROW & M. ERHARDT, CLEAR AND EFFEC· 
TIVE LEGAL WRITING (1986), Richard Lanham's two books, REVISING PROSE (1979) and RE· 
VISING BUSINESS PROSE (1981), and David Mellinkoff's two books, THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
LAW (1963) and LEGAL WRITING: SENSE AND NONSENSE (1982). 
43. See text at note 7 supra. 
44. These discoveries have been independently confirmed by a great deal of recent work in 
Psycholinguistics and Cognitive Psychology. 
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also free to be clear-minded enough to complain that "nature" lacks 
the helpful example that accompanied "method"; the sentence needs a 
parallel to "reimbursement" in order to be clear in itself. 
Note how an extension of this one principle opened the door for 
our erstwhile defender of boiler plate prose45 to be able to reconsider 
the value of the supposedly sacred prose. Here is just one sentence of 
the original boiler plate: 
Each of the Partners irrevocably waives, during the term of the Partner-
ship and during any period of the liquidation of the Partnership follow-
ing any dissolution, any right it may have to maintain any act for 
partition with respect to any of the assets of the Partnership. 
Readers expect objects to follow verbs as closely as verbs are to follow 
subjects. But here, the verb "waives" is oceans away from its object, 
"any right .... " Getting those two close together, the first revision 
looks like this: 
Each of the Partners irrevocably waives any right it may have to main-
tain any act for partition with respect to any of the assets of the Partner-
ship during the term of the Partnership and during any period of the 
liquidation of the Partnership following any dissolution. 
This new structure frees us to perceive redundancies and to ask ques-
tions. Question: Is there anything that one could "partition" that was 
not "with respect to any of the assets of the Partnership"? Answer: 
No. Question: What are "the assets of the Partnership"? Answer: 
Only its property. Question: Is there any legal difference in this in-
stance between "maintaining an act for partition" and "partitioning"? 
Answer: No. The second revision, without altering a jot of the sub-
stance, would read like this: 
Each of the Partners irrevocably waives any right it may have to parti-
tion the property during the term of the Partnership and during any 
period of the liquidation of the Partnership following any dissolution. 
One more question: What period of time is covered by "during the 
term of the Partnership and during any period of the liquidation of the 
Partnership following any dissolution"? Answer: all the rest of the 
life of the partnership. That concept is already implied by the word 
"irrevocably." Pare down "each of the partners" to "each partner," 
and eliminate the other duplication of "any right" and "it might 
have," and the final revision appears: 
Each Partner irrevocably waives any right to partition the property. 
The solving of the structural problem (verb-object separation) made it 
possible to notice and deal with the redundancies. It is quite natural 
45. See pages 337-38, supra. 
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that repairs to one part of a weakened structure will lead to the discov-
ery of yet other weaknesses. 
This methodology has been used by the present author since 1984 
in an elective course for second-year and third-year students at the 
Harvard Law School. The course has been well received, enrolling 
125-140 students yearly. Students who take the course one year are 
eligible to apply for teaching assistantships in the course for the fol-
lowing year. The Moot Court board and the Legal Methods staff also 
have been exposed to some of the materials. As a result, there are now 
at Harvard several hundred students who can talk the same language 
to each other about language and who have had similar experiences in 
revising their own prose and editing the prose of others. 
Law school is an appropriate place for students to encounter par-
ticular methods for handling the particularly complex rhetorical tasks 
they will be faced with as professionals; but until faculty and students 
alike cease being embarrassed that this "skill" has not been developed 
at earlier stages, little that is effective will be done. The writing pro-
cess is part of the thinking process. Students come to law school "to 
learn to think like a lawyer"; they should also have the opportunity to 
learn there how best to express those new and complicated thoughts. 
This calls for far more than the possession of some remedial "skill" or 
the knowledge of public rhetorical manners. Until recently most ef-
forts have been limited to learning how to sound like a lawyer; current 
stirrings in legal education lead us to hope that help is on the way. 
3. Efforts in Continuing Legal Education 
Law firms, corporations, and governmental agencies have inherited 
the writing problems faced (or not faced) by the law schools. In recent 
years there has been a growing awareness that poor rhetorical abilities 
have been the cause of much wasted time and many inferior legal writ-
ten products. Bad writing actually costs money. This realization 
came primarily to the more enlightened companies and firms, who in 
turn became willing to expend money to solve the problem. This has 
resulted in legal writing consultantships paid for by the private sector 
and writing seminars sponsored by bar associations. 
One major Chicago firm has hired the same consulting team for six 
years now, each year allowing twenty more lawyers to take the five-
day program. The positive effects seem to be expanding by osmosis 
and increasing geometrically instead of arithmetically. This year's 
"new crop" of twenty wrote significantly better than their predeces-
sors at the start of the program, yet proved to be no brighter nor more 
previously aware of principles of good writing. It can be surmised that 
November 1987] The State of Legal Writing 363 
these people had been silently influenced in their clearer style by role 
models in the firm who had previously been through the program. 
Moreover, there was a healthy sense of how hard it was to write well 
and how important it was to achieve that result. These lawyers have 
stopped conceiving of good writing as a skill that should have been 
learned much earlier and now think of it as a continuing professional 
challenge. 
A new institution has appeared that promises to offer aid to those 
struggling in the wilderness. The Legal Writing Institute was founded 
in 1984 during a conference held at the University of Puget Sound. 
The board of directors now includes people from Puget Sound, Car-
negie-Mellon, Notre Dame, Northeastern, Georgia, CUNY at Queens, 
John Marshall, Queen's University (Ontario), Willamette, Southwest-
ern, Florida, Duke, and New Mexico, appropriately demonstrating the 
widespread concern. The board's first acts were to provide for a news-
letter, a journal, and a second conference. One of the organizers, Pro-
fessor Chris Rideout from Puget Sound, identifies the Institute's goals: 
The goals of the L WI are to provide a forum for exchange of informa-
tion, through its newsletter; to encourage research and scholarship on 
legal writing and analysis, through the journal; and to sponsor a national 
conference, at least bi-annually. If we ever get rich, we can further en-
courage research through research awards.46 
C. Work in Related Fields 
The ties between law and sociology, psychology, psychiatry, busi-
ness, economics, and history have long been acknowledged and stud-
ied; but a new interest in law as language has generated some 
fascinating work in the relatively new fields of (1) Law and Literature 
and (2) Law and Language. As yet the relationships between these 
fields and composition have not been explored; those efforts should 
produce some meaningful and interesting ideas. 
The godfather of Law and Literature is Benjamin Cardozo, whose 
essays and utterances are the most often quoted in contemporary arti-
cles in the field. 
We find a kindred phenomenon in literature, alike in poetry and in prose. 
The search is for the just word, the happy phrase, that will give expres-
sion to the thought, but somehow the thought itself is transfigured by the 
phrase when found. There is emancipation in our very bonds. The re-
straints of rhyme or metre, the exigencies of period balance, liberate at 
46. Letter from Professor Chris Rideout to the author (Apr. 15, 1986). Several issues of the 
newsletter have already appeared; the first number of the journal appeared in the summer of 
1986; and the second conference was held in July 1986. The journal is called LEGAL WRITING: 
JOURNAL OF THE LEGAL WRITING INSTITUTE; the newsletter is called SECOND DRAFT. 
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times the thought which they confine, and in imprisoning release.47 
The Law and Literature movement has had a guide out of the wilder-
ness in the person of Richard Weisberg, who for many years has or-
ganized and chaired Law and Literature sessions at the Modern 
Language Association meetings, has helped to found the Law and Hu-
manities Institute, and has written much that is interesting in the field. 
His article Literature and Law offers both a summary view of new 
developments and a helpful bibliography.48 
1984 saw the publication of three substantial books on the subject: 
James B. White's When Words Lose Their Meaning, Robert Fergu-
son's Law and Letters in American Culture, and Weisberg's The Fail-
ure of the Word. All three offer ways of using perspectives and 
theories from one field in interpreting the other. It seems strange that 
it has taken so long for the legal and the literary to discover their 
common interests and mutual fascination; but now that it has begun, 
look for the avalanche. 
For the decade from the mid-70s to the mid-80s, much of literary 
criticism concerned itself with critical theory. Influenced by the work 
of Jacques Derrida and others, the critics sought new concepts of sig-
nification and new methods of interpretation. The resultant playing 
with words and contexts, which curiously resembles Talmudic exege-
sis, reinforced a reader-response theory of literature - that no text 
exists without the context of the perception of a particular reader. 
Ears of law professors across the country must have started to bum. 
Was not that concept essential to the way law is made, taught, and 
interpreted? Partially as a result, the controversial movement called 
Critical Legal Studies was born. One of its main concerns is to demon-
strate how the manipulative interpretation of legal texts can keep peo-
ple in power who have always been in power, without regard for the 
welfare of the populace at large. If this sounds familiar, it should: it is 
much the same complaint made about legal writing several pages 
back.49 And here it is, I suggest, that good work can be done in mean-
ingfully bringing law, literature, and composition studies together. All 
the concerns of structural stylistics - the manipulation of reader ex-
pectations, the creation of context, the control of ambiguity - are of 
equal interest to lawyers, to literary people, and to all kinds of 
writers.50 
47. B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 89 {1924). 
48. Weisberg & Barricelli, Literature and Law, in INTERRELATIONS OF LITERATURE 150 
(1982). 
49. See Part I.G. supra. 
50. For those who wish to investigate these issues, two law review issues will serve well. The 
Texas Law Review printed a symposium on "Law and Literature." 60 TEXAS L. REV. 373 
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A completely different set of people are drawing near the same 
meeting ground from a completely different direction. They are lin-
guists and social scientists (especially sociologists and cultural anthro-
pologists), and they are studying (primarily oral) Language and the 
Law in order to understand how tools of communication actually de-
termine legal relationships between people. The potential here seems 
to me unlimited.s1 
In summary, then: The abuse of the language in law, intentional 
or otherwise, exists and has existed for hundreds of years. What is 
new is a growing consciousness of that abuse and a will to do some-
thing about it. New structures for writing programs, combined with 
new structural methods of teaching writjng, offer a great deal of hope 
that we will not long continue to pass the problem onward and up-
ward. Continuing legal education programs seem interested in devel-
oping rhetoric as a topic for serious study. Legislative willingness to 
enact statutes that demand rhetorical reforms are increasing in 
number and are already taking effect. Critical theorists, literary inter-
preters, rhetoricians, law professors, social scientists, and linguists are 
all becoming increasingly fascinated with the effects that words have 
on audiences. Things are happening, and for the first time in our his-
tory, legal writing has become a topic of great interest, depth, and 
variety. 
Ill. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
If numbers of publications produced are directly representative of 
the professional interest in a field, then there is a strong and growing 
interest in legal writing. The following bibliography is by no means 
exhaustive. I have restricted myself mainly to American publications 
and have omitted all articles of fewer than three pages and some older 
books which seemed completely uninspired copies of each other. This 
still leaves a good amount to read. 
This bibliography demonstrates the recent, steady surge of interest 
(1982). Particularly representative is the match between Ronald Dworkin, Law As Interpreta-
tion, id. at 527, and Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Litera-
ture, id. at 551. (Professor Fish now holds a joint appointment between the English Department 
and the Law School at Duke University, thus personifying the new connection between the 
fields.) For a symposium on Critical Legal Studies, see 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
51. For an overview of what is now being done in this regard, see Brenda Danet's excellent 
and lengthy article, Danet, Language in the Legal Process, 14 L. & SocY. REV. 445 (1980). See 
also the work of sociologist William M. O'Barr, especially LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, 
POWER, AND STRATEGY IN THE COURTROOM (1982), and the work of linguist Judith N. Levi, 
especially LINGUISTICS, LANGUAGE, AND LAW: A TOPICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY (1982). Levi and 
Anne Graffam Walker have directed a conference on language in the judicial process 
(Georgetown University, July 1985). 
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in the field. Of the more than 200 articles listed, approximately twenty 
percent were published from 1975-79 and slightly more than forty per-
cent since 1980. Of the seventy or so books listed, approximately half 
were published since 1978. While it is always profitable and pleasur-
able to read anything by Zechariah Chafee, William Prosser, Fred Ro-
dell, or Rudolph Flesch, in general the newer work seems to me the 
more intriguing. 
For those who wish to sample a representation of the best now 
available, I suggest the following from this bibliography: 
A. Books and Pamphlets 
Charrow & Erhardt; Levi; Mellinkoff; Redish; Rodell. 
B. Articles on the Teaching of Legal Writing 
Gale; Rombauer; Squires. 
C. Articles Concerning the Plain English Movement 
~Allen & Engholm; Charrow & Charrow; Davis; Felsenfeld, Co-
hen & Fingerhut; Procaccia. 
D. Other Articles Concerning Law and Writing 
Allen; Benson; Collins & Hattenhauer; Danet; Engholm; Gopen; 
Hyland; O'Barr; Raymond; Rubenstein; Stark. 
A. Books and Pamphlets 
J. APPLEMAN, PERSUASION IN BRIEF WRITING (1968). 
W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS (1972). 
E. BISKIND, LEGAL WRITING SIMPLIFIED (1971). 
G. BLOCK, EFFECTIVE LEGAL WRITING: A STYLE BOOK FOR LAW 
STUDENTS AND LAWYERS (1981). 
N. BRAND & J. WHITE, LEGAL WRITING: THE STRATEGY OF PER-
SUASION (1976). 
M. BRYANT, ENGLISH INTHE LAW COURTS: THE PART THAT ARTI-
CLES, PREPOSITIONS, AND CONJUNCTIONS PLAY IN LEGAL DE-
CISIONS (1962). 
v. CHARROW, LET THE WRITER BEWARE (1979) [pamphlet]. 
- WHAT Is "PLAIN ENGLISH", ANYWAY? (1979) [pamphlet]. 
V. CHARROW & M. ERHARDT, CLEAR AND EFFECTIVE LEGAL 
WRITING (1986). 
B. CHAUDHURI, THE ART OF WRITING JUDGMENTS (1963). 
R. COOK, LEGAL DRAFTING (1951). 
F. COOPER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL WRITING (1953). 
- WRITING IN LAW PRACTICE (rev. ed. 1963). 
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J. DERNBACH & R. SINGLETON, II, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL 
WRITING AND LEGAL METHOD (1981). 
R. DICK, LEGAL DRAFTING (2d ed. 1985). 
R. DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING (1965). 
- MATERIALS ON LEGAL DRAFTING (1981). 
P. DWYER, LAW WRITERS' GUIDE (1959). 
D. FELKER, DOCUMENT DESIGN: A REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT 
RESEARCH (1971). 
- GUIDELINES FOR DOCUMENT DESIGNERS (1981). 
C. FELSENFELD & A. SIEGEL, WRITING CONTRACTS IN PLAIN ENG-
LISH (1981). 
R. FLESCH, THE ART OF CLEAR THINKING (1951). 
- How TO WRITE, SPEAK, AND THINK MORE EFFECTIVELY (1960). 
-THE ART OF PLAIN TALK (1962). 
-THE ART OF READABLE WRITING (1974). 
- How TO WRITE PLAIN ENGLISH: A BOOK FOR LA WYERS AND 
CONSUMERS (1979). 
M. FONTHAM, WRITTEN AND ORAL ADVOCACY (1985). 
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